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For the first time since the onset of the debt crisis in the slimmer or
1982, capital began to return to Latin America during 1990 and 1991:
a phenomenon analyzed by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993). III
general, Latin America's re-entry into the international capital mar-
kets, as noted by EI-Erian (1992), was perceived as a positive develop_
ment. However, policy-makers in the region have also voiced SOllle
concern about the less favourable side-effects of these capital inflows.
First, it was feared that the real exchange rate appreciation that of tell
accompanies these inflows would adversely affect the international
competitiveness of the export sector. Second, there was concern thaI
the inflows could be reversed abruptly, possibly doing considerable
damage to the domestic financial system in the process. The fear (If
reversal was based on the experience of the debt crisis, which fol-
lowed on the heels of the 'capital bonanza' of 1978-81.
This chapter compares the recent capital inflows experience with
that of the late 1970s. The analysis examines the differences and simi-
larities between the two episodes over three broad areas:
I. Domestic macroeconomic conditions in the recipient countries at
the outset of both episodes.
2. The behaviour of the external factors that influence the international
allocation of capital.
3. The response of key macroeconomic variables, such as the real ex-
change rate, reserves, and stock prices to the inflow of capital.
The chapter assesses the vulnerability of these economies to an unex-
pected swift reversal in capital inflows, and whether there are signs
that the vulnerability has changed appreciably over time.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic
empirical characteristics of capital inflows during the episodes of the
late 1970s, together with the more recent experience of 1990-1. The
section also examines quantitatively the extent to which these capital
inflow episodes were a regional phenomenon as opposed to a country-
specific event. Section 3 reviews various indicators of initial condi-
tions in both episodes. Section 4 examines the role played by external
factors, such as interest rates and capital account developments in the
USA, which affect the pattern of capital flows in these economies.
This section draws heavily on our previous work, Calvo, Leiderman,
and Reinhart (1993). Final remarks and some policy implications are
discussed briefly in Section 5.
First we shall discuss the anatomy of capital inflows, then turn to the
responses of various macroeconomic variables to the inflows, and
finally compare the degree of regional co-movements in the previous
and current episodes.
While the recent capital inflows to the region were sizeable, amount-
ing to US$24 billion in 1990 and about US$40 billion in 1991, to date
these magnitudes remain well below those observed during the pre-
vious episode of 1978 - 81.1 As Table 6.1 highlights, the orders of
magnitude, in US$, are quite similar to those observed during 1978-9,
the first two years of the earlier episode? However, when measured
relative to the gross domestic product (GDP) it is clear that the recent
inflows do not match the experience of the late 1970s. The same ap-
plies to the transfer of resources to Latin America, defined as net capital
inflow minus net payment of profits and interest, which in each year
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Table 6.1 Latin America: balance of payments, 1973-91
Do/mice all goods. Balallces all capital Dalallce all copilol O"erall balollce'
services olld private accomJl1 aCCa1/1l1p/I/S /lei
trallsfus' errors and om;ss;01lS1
Year US$ billian % of US$ billioll % of US$ billioll % of US$ billioll % of
GDP GDP GDP GDP
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1973 -4.7 -2.4 8.5 4.4 3.8 2.0
1974 -13.5 -5.3 13.3 5.2 -0.2 -0.1
1975 -16.3 -6.1 14.7 5.5 -1.6 -0.6
1976 -11.8 -3.8 16.9 5.4 5.1 1.6
1977 -11.6 -2.7 19.8 4.6 16.4 3.8 4.8 1.1
1978 -19.4 -4.0 30.5 6.2 27.4 5.6 8.0 1.6
1979 -21.7 -3.8 35.0 6.2 32.9 5.8 11.2 2.0
1980 -30.3 -4.3 47.0 6.7 34.0 4.9 3.7 0.5
1981 -43.5 -5.5 59.4 7.4 41.9 5.3 -1.6 -0.2
1982 -42.2 -5.5 45.1 5.9 23.0 3.0 -19.2 -2.5
1983 -11.6 -1.7 22.4 3.2 13.6 1.9 2.0 0.3
1984 -3.2 -0.5 15.5 2.3 12.5 1.8 9.3 1.4
1985 -4.4 -0.6 6.7 0.9 5.5 0.8 1.1 0.2
1986 -18.9 -2.6 14.2 1.9 12.3 1.7 -6.6 -1.0
1987 -12.0 -1.6 14.5 1.9 15.3 2.0 3.3 0.4
1988 -12.4 -1.5 8.2 1.0 4.7 0.6 -7.7 -0.9
1989 -10.0 -1.1 15.7 1.7 12.1 1.3 2.1 0.2
1990 -8.8 -0.8 24.1 2.3 23.9 2.3 15.1 1.4
1991 -22.3 -2.1 38.1 3.8 39.8 3.9 17.5 1.7
Notes:
I A minus sign indicates a deficit in the pertinent account. Balance on goods. services and
private transfers is equal to the current account balance less official transfers. The lalter arc
treated in this table as external financing and are included in the capital account.
I Column (7) equals the sum of columns (1) and (5). A positive sign in column (7) indicales
accumulation of international reserves by the monetary authorities.
of the earlier episode was about double the value of the inflows in
1991 - US$12 billion a year in the late 1970s compared to US$6
billion in 1991 (see Griffith-Jones et al., 1992).
Figure 6.1 provides country-specific evidence of some of these
developments. It shows that net capital inflows were larger in the recent
episode only in Bolivia and Mexico, where the capital account balance
as a share of GDP in 1991 reached 3.6 and 7.6 per cent, respectively.
For Argentina, the net inflows amounted to 1.7 per cent of GDP in
1991, or about half the 3.3 per cent peak of 1979. In the case of Chile,
net capital inflows in 1990 were about 6 per cent of GDP, well below
the level of 15 per cent in 1981, the year of the largest inflows in the
earlier episode. Similarly, capital inflows to Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay
and Venezuela during the current episode were small in comparison to
those of the previous episode.
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Table 6.2 Latin America: items in the capital account 1973-91,
US$ billion
Net external Non-debt Net asset Errors and
Year borrowing creating flows transactions I omissions' Total
\973 6.0 2.5 8.5
1974 \1.1 2.2 \3.3
1975 \1.4 3.3 14.7
1976 14.2 2.7 16.9
1977 19.4 2.8 -2.5 -3.4 16.4
1978 28.0 4.9 -2.5 -3.1 27.4
1979 30.2 7.2 -2.4 -2.1 32.9
1980 43.1 6.8 -3.0 -13.0 34.0
1981 61.0 8.2 -8.9 -17.5 42.8
1982 45.7 7.2 -7.7 -22.1 23.0
1983 \8.7 4.6 -0.9 -8.8 13.6
1984 14.1 4.5 -3.1 -3.0 12.5
1985 6.2 6.1 -5.4 -1.4 5.5
1986 11.3 4.3 -1.3 -1.9 12.3
1987 10.0 6.0 -1.2 0.5 15.3
1988 3.8 8.8 -4.3 -3.5 4.7
1989 10.9 6.9 -2.\ -3.6 \2.1
1990 28.0 8.6 -12.5 -0.2 23.9
1991 17.3 14.1 6.7 1.7 39.8
An important difference between the two episodes of capital inflows
is evident from columns (7) and (8) of Table 6.1. For the region as a
whole, capital inflows have financed less of the current account deficits
and more of the reserves accumulation in the present episode than in
the earlier episode, as analyzed by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart
(1993).
Table 6.2 presents a breakdown of the types of capital flow to
Latin America. While net external borrowing is the key item in the
capital account of the region both in the late 1970s and early 1990s,
as Collins et al. (1992) suggest, the composition of capital inflows is
markedly different in the two episodes. First, they note that private-
sector borrowing through bank loans and bond issues was significantly
lower in the recent episode. Second, foreign direct investment was
much higher in 1991, - reaching US$14 billion - than in the late
1970s, and included cash inflows of US$3.5 billion from the privati-
zation of state-owned enterprises, particularly in Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela. These inflows as a result of privatization
are a relatively new phenomenon; they were not present in the 1970s.
Third, the 'errors and omissions' item was much smaller compared to
the early 1980s. This may well indicate that current capital flight was
considerably smaller than in the earlier episode as discussed by Mathieson
and Rojas-Suarez (1992).3 Put differently, net external borrowing rep-
resents a larger percentage of total capital inflows in the earlier epi-
sode than in the present one, and the opposite is true for the relative
size of non-debt-creating flows.
How did the region respond to the capital inflows? Consider first
the behaviour of official reserves, as depicted in Figure 6.2. It shows
that in real terms the accumulation of official reserves in the current
episode matched or exceeded those of the previous episode for most
countries. Reserve accumulation was substantial in Argentina, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela, about the same in Brazil, Colom-
bia, Peru and Uruguay, and in Chile smaller in the current episode
than in the earlier one.
Capital inflows are typically accompanied by real exchange rate
appreciation. According to Figure 6.3, the recent real exchange rate
appreciation was similar to that observed in 1978-79, although the
recent level of the exchange rate remains well below the levels of the
late 1970s and the early 1980s.4 The appreciation of the real exchange
rate is now somewhat greater in Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela,
but about the same in the remaining countries. When comparing the
timing .of reserves accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation,
most of the evidence in both episodes suggests that the accumulation
of reserves precedes real exchange rate appreciation.
Capital inflows are also often associated with stock market booms.
Figure 6.4 indicates that the booms in the stock markets of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Mexico are roughly comparable.s While a part of
these booms can be accounted for by the same fundamental factors
that give rise to capital inflows, •speculative bubbles' may also have
played an important role.
Notes:
I These two categories are included in net external borrowing and non-debt
creating flows for 1973-6.
Totals may not tally due to rounding.
SOl/rce: Data for western hemisphere, IMF, World Economic Ol/tlook, vari-
ous issues.
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2.2 Regional Co-movements: Then and Now
Despite wide differences in policies and conditions, there is an im-
0 0 portant degree of co-movement across countries in the bahaviour ofID ID
capital inflows, official reserves, the real exchange rate, stock market
~
returns, and interest rate differentials illustrated in Figures 6.1 to 6.4.
~ Indeed, in an earlier paper, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) we'" '".c .c
E E provided statistical evidence in support of the notion that the recent
0
0
0
...J E E episode of capital inflows embodied a key common component that~ uID '0 x ID -M M 0a: ~ w ~ was of a regional, rather than a country-specific nature. The presencem .0 ::; .0
E E of a strong common element across countries in the region was inter-:J :J
Z Z..• preted as being the result of a common external shock affecting LatinN ::i
'" America.6 In this sub-section we examine whether the previous (1978 - 81)""t...
\:l episode, shared this regional dimension.~ ::s
""t In order to assess quantitatively the extent of co-movement among
\J
the various economic time series considered, we used 'principal COIll-2
0
t'l
ponents' analysis. We began by taking an individual time series - say>< 0()
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 v t: the official reserves for each of the ten countries and then constructed0 In 0 ~ ~ In " '00M N N C ... a smaller set of series of the principal components, to explain as much..... '"v Ii:
u tlJ of the variance of the original series as is possible.?'C0... 't' In principle, it would have been desirable to use direct data on capital•...
v ~ inflows. However, for most of the countries in our sample these dataE '":l .;:: were only available on an annual basis. Consequently, we analyzed'" '"c Q:;
0 the extent of co-movement in the official reserves and the real ex-U ~
en ... change rates for which monthly data are available, as proxies for capital~::J ... inflows. In addition, using monthly data, the extent of co-movement>-. \:lc::i ::s.0 01 in inflation rates was examined."g S . d The periods considered were: the previous capital inflows episode,~ •....• II ~ 0
q::lloo~ .~ running from January 1978 to December 1981, and, for comparison
~ ~ v t- ..... .. "~O\ ~ 0 purposes, the following four years, that is, January 1982 to December.c .c v)'0\ - e-
« E E a ......~:l 0 1985. Similarly, we considered the recent episode, running from Januaryz 0 0 U
i= E w E
.....•~ §
Z ID '0 ...J ID '0 '" "0 =' I-j ~ 1990 to March 1992, and for comparison purposes the period immedi-w M i: M v ":l§'" ()l!l Q; u ~ u § ately preceding it, from January 1988 to December 1989. The analysisa: .0 .0 'C en§ •....•B« E E 0. ::J •....•.. O l:
:J :J V C ~ that follows uses the logs of reserves and the real exchange rate. The..• z z ~ .5 ~ -g ~..• U
N N 8 (;j inflation rate is the 12-month difference in the log of the consumerV) o.~ d)
'" ~ .~ fr.S l:(;J .!2 price index.'C fr '" ...... :;;
~ v o..~::sC; The key results that emerged from examining the extent of co-move-~ 0::: ~ 5·9.~ E~ ment across countries in reserves, the real exchange rate and inflationU u > t C"I- o v v v'Ci ciio:::o':> .... are presented in Table 6.3 and summarized in words:
0 0 '" ~... <.; \J
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 ::l ~
...
0 0 0 g 0 0 0 0 0 ~ .~ 0 ::s~ ~ m ..• N In ..• M N Cll.:., :<: t'l
Establishing the co-movement in macroeconomic series,
previous and recent episodes
Previo/ls episode
Jail. 1978-
Dec. /98/
Debt crisis years 2nd episode Recellt episode
Jail. /982- Jail. /988- .Jail. /990-
Dec. /985 Dec. /989 NOI'. 199/
Possible explanations may be: (a) since there was less intervention
at that time, the exchange rate was allowed to react to the inflow
more uniformly; and (b) the exchange-rate-based stabilizations (or
tablitas) in the Southern Cone during the earlier period were better
synchronized than the stabilization programmes of the last two years
considered.
4. The extent of co-movement in the domestic inflation rate, a vari-
able less obviously linked to external factors, diminished in the
recent episode of capital inflows relative to that of the previous
two years, 1988 and 1989; whereas in the previous episode the
extent of co-movement was about the same as that which charac-
terized the following four years.
REAL EXCHANGE RATE
First principal component 0.81 0.51 0.41 0.58
Second principal component 0.96 0.71 0.78 0.79
Chi-square (45) 1274.55 470.50 302.01 286.31
Probability value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
RESERVES
First principal component 0.58 0.50 0.48 0.67
Second principal component 0.77 0.74 0.69 0.80
Chi-square (45) 645.28 431.26 204.97 297.23
Probability value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
DOMESTIC INFLATION RATE
(12-month percentage change)
First principal component 0.57 0.53 0.60 0.45
Second principal component 0.81 0.78 0.88 0.64
Chi-square (45) 744.82 783.49 475.94 306.40
Probability value (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
1. The extent of co-movement in reserves and the real exchange rate
across countries is markedly greater in the previous capital inflows
episode from January 1978 to December 1981 than in the debt crisis
years, that is, January 1982 to December 1985. Similarly, the de-
gree of co-movement in reserves and the real exchange rate across
countries is greater in the recent capital inflows episode of Janu-
ary 1990 to March 1992 than in the previous two years. Increased
co-movements under capital inflows could possibly be explained
by external shocks that are common to the region.s
2. The degree of co-movement in reserves across countries is greater
in the recent episode. Two possible explanations are: (a) greater
intervention in the recent episode, aimed at either avoiding exchange
rate appreciation or at increasing reserves as a cushion against possible
adverse future shocks; or (b) an attempt to bring the reserve-to-
imports ratios back to their 'long-run' values - which seems plausible
given that in the recent episode eight of the ten countries were
below their' long-run' reserve-to-imports ratios, as discussed in greater
detail below.
3. The co-variation in real exchange rates was much greater in the
January 1978 to December 1981 period than in any period since.
Initial conditions may play a key role in determining the economic
performance and response to capital inflows. They may also deter-
mine the vulnerability of a given economy or region to a reversal of
those flows. Accordingly, we focus on comparing some of the simi-
larities and differences in the initial conditions in the Latin American
countries under study. Initial conditions are represented by various
indicators for the region for 1977 - 8 and 1988 - 9, the two periods
immediately preceding both episodes of capital inflows; these are
discussed in the next section.
The main results from this comparison are summarized below:
Note: The cumulative R' gives the percentage of the variance of the original series explained
by the firsl principal component. the firsl two principal components, and so on.
1. External debt indicators suggest that most of these countries were
more vulnerable to an adverse external shock, for example, in the
form of an increase in world interest rates, in the 1990s after the
debt crisis, than in the 1970s. While the sharp declines in US and
other international interest rates have gone a long way towards re-
ducing the debt-servicing burdens of these ten heavily-indebted
countries, external debt ratios were sharply higher, as shown in
Table 6.4, at the outset of the current capital inflow episode.
Further, as shown in Table 6.4, the proportion of external debt carry-
ing a variable interest rate is much higher now in most of the sample
countries.
2. In eight of the ten countries considered, the ratio of official inter-
national reserves to imports was higher at the outset of the pre-
vious episode, and closer to its long-run average, as illustrated in
Floating-rate debt
as a percentage of
total long-term
debt
1977 1989
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
39.4
30.9
54.6
17.5
9.1
45.5
53.1
30.3
21.4
60.2
83.2
22.3
71.0
69.6
46.0
63.7
79.4
32.3
73.1
87.3
Ratio of total Official reserves as a ratio
external debt to of nominal imports in
exports of goods US$
and sen/ices
1980 1989 1977 1989
242.4
258.2
304.3
192.5
117.1
203.1
259.2
207.7
104.1
131.8
511.3
433.8
295.0
174.6
208.3
386.8
250.0
415.7
161.3
205.1
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook;
and World Bank, World Debt Tables, various issues.
Table 6.4. The fact that reserves at the outset of the present epi-
sode were, more often than not, below their long-run averages may
explain why reserve accumulation has been greater in the current
episode.
3. Vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks has been a common charac-
teristic of most Latin-American economies. This vulnerability can
be partially assessed by examining the structure of merchandise
exports, which provides an idea as to the extent of diversification
in the export base of these countries. Table 6.5 presents a break-
down of exports into broad groupings for the years 1977 and 1989.
The picture that emerges is mixed. Some countries - notably Bra-
zil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico - have made considerable progress
in diversifying their export base since the late 1970s. Others have
not appreciably changed the structure of exports and remain vul-
nerable to the vagaries of international commodity prices.
4. The public sector was larger and showed weaker budgetary disci-
pline in the first episode. As Table 6.5 indicates, government con-
sumption as a share of GDP is markedly lower in the recent episode
for the majority of countries, with the exception of Brazil and Co-
lombia. The stronger commitment to reduced government interven-
tion in the recent episode is also evident in the volume of privatization
in a number of the countries. For example, during 1991, Argentina,
1976-7 1981-2 1987-8
Argentina 4.6 6.0 17.1
Bolivia 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil 10.0 12.8 18.6
Chile 2.1 1.9 11.7
Colombia 3.7 3.5 6.4
Ecuador 0.1
Mexic 3.2 2.7 11.3
Peru 1.0 0.3 0.1
Uruguay 5.5 3.5 21.7
Venezuela 1.7 5.5 8.6
Source: Guidotti and Kumar (1991).
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela raised about US$15 billion through
the privatization of state-owned enterprises; as indicated earlier,
US$3.5 billion of this was cashed as inflow from abroad. Financial
markets have also been liberalized in a number of countries. The
reduction in the size of government and the move towards privati-
zation and deregulation suggest that the resurgence of capital inflows
during 1990-1 may be taking place against a backdrop of stronger
fiscal policy fundamentals.
5. Despite these positive developments, the debt burden in the public
sector is larger now than it was in the earlier episode as shown in
Table 6.6. Thus, from 1976-7 to 1987-8 the ratio of domestic
public debt to GDP increased in Argentina from 4.6 per cent to
17.1 per cent; in Brazil from 10 per cent to 18.6 per cent; in Chile
from 2.1 per cent to 11.7 per cent, and in Mexico from 3.2 per
cent to 11.3 per cent. This is one of the legacies of a decade of
fiscal deficits. Combining these developments with those in item
1. above indicates that between the 1970s and the 1990s there was
a marked increase in both the external and the internal public debt
of Latin America.
6. Because part of the capital inflows is monetized through non-sterilized
central bank intervention, for example in Argentina, it is useful to as-
sess the inflationary potential of these flows. If monetization were
met by an increase in the quantity of real money balances demanded,
then there would be no inflationary pressures arising from the inflows,
so we examined the velocity of circulation of Ml and found evidence
of increased levels of velocity in most countries. Some of the in-
creased monetization could have contributed to reducing velocity
towards earlier levels; such a move would be consistent with the
reduction in the rate of inflation observed in most countries and
with the re-activation of the real sector.
7. Turning to the real sector, initial conditions during the earlier epi-
sode were more favourable than in the current one. Between 1976
and 1977, real GDP in Latin America grew at a rate of 5.4 per cent
a year. In contrast, in 1988-9 real GDP growth in the region was
less than 1 per cent a year. At the start of the previous episode the
ratio of investment to GDP was relatively high - about 21 per cent
for the region as a whole. Relatively high levels were observed for
both the public and private sector investment components. These
relatively high ratios were maintained, and even slightly increased,
during the earlier inflows of 1978 - 81. However, all these invest-
ment ratios were markedly reduced during the debt crisis years,
thereby leaving weaker initial conditions for the present episode.
Are the present capital inflows being used to finance increases in
investment? Our examination of the data suggests that in most cases,
no major changes in investment ratios were observed during 1991.
The exceptions appear to be Chile and Mexico, where some in-
creases were observed. For the region as a whole, however, it is
safe to conclude that so far the present capital inflows have not
financed major increases in private or public sector investments.
Thus, questions can arise as to how the Latin-American countries
will generate the resources required to repay the new external debts
associated with the recent capital inflows.
8. Latin-American stock markets are typically shallow, volatile, and
particularly vulnerable to developments in international capital
markets. While market capitalization has universally increased in
the recent past for all the larger Latin-American markets,9 it is pri-
marily driven by soaring stock prices. To gauge if these markets
have deepened during the past decade, it may be necessary to look
at other indicators, such as measures of volatility and the number
of companies listed in the stock exchanges. In fact, the number of
companies listed in the largest stock exchanges in these countries,
appears to be falling. In 1980, 278 companies were listed on the
Buenos Aires stock exchange and 265 companies on Chile's San-
tiago exchange. However, by 1989 the number of companies had
fallen to 178 and 213, for Argentina and Chile respectively. The
trend is similar for Venezuela and Colombia, while the number of
companies in the Mexican stock exchange is about the same now
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as it was in the early 1980s. Brazil provides the exception, as the
number of listings there rose from 426 in 1980 to 592 in 1989.10
Overall, stock markets appear to be at least as vulnerable now as
they were at the start of the earlier capital inflows episode.
Summing up, several important indicators point to weaker initial con-
ditions in the current capital inflows episode than in the earlier one.
In particular, there is now a higher burden of domestic and external
public debt; a larger portion of the external debt is now subject to
variable rates; reserves are now lower relative to imports, and growth
and investment as a percentage of GDP are now lower than in the
earlier episode. Moreover, in most of the sample countries current
capital inflows have not been used so far to finance any marked in-
crease in investment. However, other indicators work in the opposite
direction. Namely, there are leaner public sectors after the debt crisis,
that is, structural deficits are lower; there is a strong commitment to
lower budget deficits and inflation and to the reform and privatiza-
tion of the various economies - all of which suggests future capabil-
ity to deal with debt repayments. II These positive developments have
probably dominated the overall outlook of the region, as reflected in
the recent restoration of voluntary capital market financing for Latin-
American countries.
Our earlier work maintained that some of the renewal of capital inflows
to Latin America in the 1990s was due to external factors, which could
be considered an external shock common to the region. A compari-
son with the 1970s suggests that similar considerations applied then
as well, as shown in Table 6.7. The main external factors at work in
both episodes are as follows.
I. There was a decline in nominal and real interest rates in the USA.
In 1975-7 nominal US interest rates were 30 per cent lower than
in 1972 - 4, and in 199 I they were 50 per cent below 1989 levels.
In both episodes, ex post real interest rates were relatively low;
and even negative between 1974 and 1980, as shown in Table 6.8.
By reducing the external debt service on floating rate debts, the
recent decline in US interest rates has improved the solvency of
Latin-American debtors; as reflected in a rise in the secondary market
prices for their loans.
Table 6.7 External factors: selected US indicators
Annual average
1990-11972-81 1982-91 1978-81 1982-9
Balance of USA with
Latin America and other
western hemisphere countries on:
Current account
5642 -7955 11676 -8060 -7535(US$ m)
Private capital account
-7864 15724 -8434 15620 16140(US$ m)
Private capital account
incl. statistical discrepancy*
-6201 7637 -10 766 7809 6947(US$ m)
7.8 7.6 10.7 7.1 6.53-month treasury bill rate (%)
8.5 4.1 10.7 4.0 4.8Inflation (% change)
-0.7 3.5 -0.0 3.9 1.7Ex-post real interest rate (%)
2.8 2.4 2.4 2.9 0.1Real GDP growth (%)
Real capital gains/losses
-0.1 3.6 -0.8 5.1 -2.7real estate (%)
-4.6 7.5 -3.4 9.1 1.5S&P500 index (%)
Notes: '11 11 'nclude capital flight
* The statistical discrepancy ~l n~~~~e~ ~y deflating the nomi~al indices by theI. Real equity and real estate pnces 0 al
~~nsUl~er P;i~:i~~~~\~<;~~' was used as the indicator for the real estate market.
;: A ~r:~~es?gn on the capital account denotes a capital outflow from the USA to
Latin America.
Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Mexico
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela
1978-81
7.7
12.9
0.7
8.7
-2.4
6.2
32.5
11.4
5.9
12.8
Average
1982-9
-1.0
2.8
7.7
9.5
9.3
1.8
0.0
-2.4
5.9
-5.2
1990-1
10.6
4.0
-9.0
-0.4
9.2
0.6
8.3
-7.9
1.5
6.8
2. The value and purchasing power of Latin-American exports markedly
increased before or at the start of the capital inflow episodes. As
detailed in Table 6.8, real export earnings expanded at a healthy
rate in all ten countries during 1972 - 81. Thus, despite heavy bor-
rowing to finance current account deficits, ratios of debt to ex-
ports remained stable. Between 1975 - 6 and 1977 - 8, the value of
Latin-American exports rose by 40 per cent and the purchasing power
of exports increased by 13 per cent. Similarly, between 1986-7
and 1988-9 the value of Latin-American exports increased by 29
per cent and the purchasing power of exports rose by 14 per cent.
These developments cannot be accounted for by fluctuations in
the terms of trade alone. In fact, the terms of trade were rising at
the start of the earlier episode, but were decreasing at the start of
the recent one; their level during the latter was about 20 per cent
lower than at the start of the previous episode. Interestingly, it is
precisely at times of improved export performance that Latin-Ameri-
can countries borrow more from abroad.
3. In both episodes of capital inflows, external conditions resulted
in an increase in the availability of loanable funds in international
capital markets. In this respect, the recycling of petro-dollars played
an important role in the 1970s. However, as industrial countries
drifted into recession, the funds were loaned elsewhere, and Latin
America was one of the main recipients. In this connection, Sachs
(1989) indicates that during the two years 1980 and 1981, total
bank exposure to the major debtor countries nearly doubled com-
pared with 1979. In the two years 1980 and 1981, after the rise in
real interest rates, the commercial banks made about as many net
loans to the major debtors as during the entire period 1973-9. Similar
considerations apply to the 1990s, in that in addition to low interest
rates, there were weak performances in equity and real estate mar-
kets in the USA, as was seen in Table 6.7. Real stock prices were
somewhat stronger in the current episode than during most of the
1980s, while real estate was weaker. In both cases it is clear that
the investment climate in the USA was relatively unattractive, and
investors had incentives to seek opportunities elsewhere, for exam-
ple, in Latin America. This reallocation of international capital flows
is evident from Table 6.7, which shows a marked rise in capital
outflows from the USA to Latin America during both episodes.
When these foreign factors are quantified in the form of principal
components - as in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993) - it is
found that they account for a sizeable fraction - about 50 per cent -
of the forecast error variance of official reserves and real exchange
rates of the ten countries in our sample. Thus, while the economic
and political reforms in a number of these countries have been instru-
mental in the re-entry of Latin America to the international credit ma~kets
- and indeed there is a significant statistical residual to be accounted
for - the evidence suggests that economic conditions in the USA may
also have played an important role in shaping the patterns of capital
inflows into Latin America in both these episodes.12
The restoration of voluntary access to international credit markets is,
without doubt, a positive development for Latin America. However,
given that the previous episode of capital inflows ended in the debt
crisis of the 1980s, there is well-founded concern that the present trends
could be reversed. The reversible nature of the inflows would be
particularly marked if a sizeable share of the capital inflows were
Ihot money'. It is therefore necessary to assess the extent to which
these economies are vulnerable to a sudden withdrawal of interna-
tional capital.
In some areas Latin-American countries are better placed now than
in the late 1970s. For example, governments have reduced their spending
and structural deficits; policies are oriented towards privatization and
deregulation; and inflation is being brought under control in a number
of countries in the region. In addition, during the decade of the 1980s
most of these countries learned to cope with adverse terms-of-trade
shocks and successfully maintained growth in real export earnings through
the expansion of the volume of exports. There is evidence too that
some of these countries were successful in further diversifying their
export base. This scenario contrasts with the late 1970s, when the buoyant
export performance was largely due to favourable terms of trade. As
the experience of the 1980s shows, the external shock was fully re-
versed in an abrupt manner. It appears that much of the aggressive
lending by commercial banks during 1979-81 was based on the ex-
pectation that the favourable terms of trade environment would per-
sist.
While these economies have become more resilient in a number of
important areas over the past decade, there are other areas where their
vulnerability has increased. As the key debt ratios show, external and
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While governments everywhere are faced with formulating economic
pOlicy in order to achieve national objectives, the world economic
system has evolved in ways that have made countries interdependent.
International linkages through the balance of payments permit spillovers,
internationally, of the effects of policy actions and non-policy dis-
turbances, but they also impose constraints on the types and extent of
use of various instruments that policy-makers must take into con-
sideration. PartiCUlarly in Africa, the implications of international
constraints for the conduct of economic policy is a topical issue. This
topicality is due to the fact that although economic openness gener-
ally offers an opportunity for gains from international trade and capital
flows, it has remained a major source of shocks to African econ-
omies. Moreover, while the benefits and tensions associated with
economic interdependence are scarcely new phenomena nor limited
to Africa, the generally poor economic performance of African econ-
omies in the 1970s and 1980s has raised issues regarding the effectiveness
of the conduct of economic policy in African countries in the pres-
ence of external shocks and the role of the international financial
system in African policy-making.
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief survey of the issues
related to international constraints, and the conduct of economic policy
with part.icular reference to African countries. Section 2 describes the
nature of international constraints relevant to the African situation,
and their roles in the analysis of the conduct of economic policy
